Blog

When dependencies become sovereignty risks

Every CIO knows that an IT landscape has dependencies. These are usually managed through contracts, SLAs, and governance, which makes them feel manageable. The question is what happens when that assumption no longer holds true.

18 Nov 26
5
min read

Dependencies and control

Every CIO knows that an IT landscape has dependencies. These are usually managed through contracts, SLAs, and governance, which makes them feel manageable. The question is what happens when that assumption no longer holds true.

Under stable conditions, dependencies are easy to manage. Pricing, service levels, and responsibilities are defined and negotiated. Vendor lock-in and commercial dependency are not trivial, but they are known and can largely be covered contractually.

In this context, sovereignty is about control: the ability to make your own decisions regarding your IT systems, data, and processes. Dependencies are not a problem in themselves. They only become one when they demonstrably limit that control.

When the nature of dependencies changes

A supplier can be held to an agreement. A government cannot.

That distinction becomes crucial under geopolitical pressure. What seems like a standard supplier dependency can change in nature when external actors gain influence over that relationship. The dependency itself does not change, but the control over it does.

Recent geopolitical developments have made this dynamic visible in practice. They introduce risks that fall outside the contractual domain and are not mitigated by traditional governance.

Access to data beyond your control

The first risk is data access. Legal frameworks such as the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and Executive Order 12333 provide intelligence agencies with mechanisms to access data belonging to non-US persons [1], [2]. In addition, legislation such as the US CLOUD Act allows authorities, under specific legal conditions, to compel service providers to disclose data, regardless of where that data is stored [3].

This is not a matter of data location, but of legal jurisdiction. From a sovereignty perspective, the key issue is not how frequently such access occurs, but that it can happen without the data owner's involvement or control.

Continuity is no longer guaranteed

The second risk concerns continuity. Many European organizations are heavily dependent on non-European suppliers for their critical infrastructure, from cloud platforms to software ecosystems. Under normal circumstances, this dependency is acceptable and manageable.

Recent developments suggest that this assumption is less stable than it appears. Sanctions regimes have shown that access to services can be restricted or revoked with immediate effect, halting your products overnight. Not due to a breach of contract, but as a result of political decisions. The sanctions imposed in response to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine demonstrated this on a large scale, with organisations losing access to critical services virtually overnight [4], [5], [6].

The recent case involving the International Criminal Court, where access to cloud services was reportedly disrupted due to US sanctions, illustrates the same dynamic in a European context [7]. The dependency remains the same. What changes is who ultimately controls that access.

This brings with it a different kind of risk: the potential loss of access to critical systems, beyond the control of both the customer and the supplier.

Reassessing control

Most organizations already ask the right questions when assessing their IT landscape: which legal frameworks apply, who manages the operational processes and the platform, and whether an organization can realistically leave a supplier. The question is how these answers are interpreted. In a purely contractual or technical context, they often seem sufficient. Within that framework, control appears to be guaranteed.

Geopolitical pressure changes that framework. Decisions in Washington or Beijing can override SLAs, contracts, and compliance frameworks – without warning and without recourse. If the control your risk register assumes can be nullified by a foreign government, that control is conditional.

That gap is no longer theoretical. As geopolitical pressure on digital infrastructure increases, the circumstances under which dependencies pose a risk to sovereignty are becoming more frequent. What was once an exception is now a standard consideration.

References

[1] FISA SECTION 702[2] Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities[3] The CLOUD Act, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)[4] Restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising Ukraine, Council of the European Union.[5] Explainer: What is SWIFT and how will its removals impact Russia?[6] More western tech companies set out Russian exit plans.[7] Microsoft denies having suspended any services to ICC.

This blog post was originally published on navara.nl

Featured posts

We don't do off-the-shelf job openings. We create your ultimate role based on your personal ambitions and expertise.

Blog

The art of reducing complexity in software

Software development is often about adding new functionality. But as a solution grows, a different challenge arises: how do you ensure it remains understandable, maintainable, and extensible? The biggest obstacles to successful software projects are often not new features or technologies, but the complexity that builds up over time.

Blog

Azure AI Foundry as the foundation for enterprise AI

Why organizations need one integrated platform to safely bring AI into production.

Blog

Using AI isn't that hard, but getting real value out of it is.

Normally, as an IT organization, you have to explain why a new technology or tool is interesting. With generative AI, the opposite happened: employees started using it themselves and immediately saw its value. From creating texts and presentations to analyses and initial drafts of reports. And that creates a new reality.